Cybersecurity Whistleblower Protections

An overview of the protections and rewards available to cybersecurity whistleblowers under federal and state law.

By Alexis Ronickher

February 2017
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................................. 1

CURRENT PROTECTIONS FOR CYBERSECURITY WHISTLEBLOWERS ............................................. 1  
   A. Federal Statutes Providing Protections to Cybersecurity Whistleblowers ............................................. 1
      1. Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank Protections ................................................................................... 2
      2. Protections for Employees of Banks and Other Depository Institutions .......................................... 5
      3. False Claims Act Protections ............................................................................................................ 6
      4. Protections for Nuclear Whistleblowers ........................................................................................... 7
      5. Protections for Federal Government Employees .............................................................................. 8
   B. State Laws Prohibiting Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy .................................... 9
      1. Federal Law Bases for Public Policy ................................................................................................. 10
      2. State Law Bases for Public Policy .................................................................................................. 11

REWARDS FOR CYBERSECURITY WHISTLEBLOWERS ....................................................................... 12 
   A. SEC Whistleblower Program ..................................................................................................................... 12
   B. CFTC Whistleblower Program ................................................................................................................... 13
   C. Qui Tam Lawsuits under the False Claims Act ..................................................................................... 13

THINGS TO THINK ABOUT BEFORE YOU BLOW THE WHISTLE ..................................................... 14  
   A. Report a Violation of Law, Not Just Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities .................................................... 14
   B. Report in Writing to Someone Who Can Address the Problem ............................................................ 15
   C. Be Careful About Taking Documents .................................................................................................. 15
   D. Seek Legal Representation .................................................................................................................... 15
   E. If Terminated, Diligently Look For New Work ..................................................................................... 15

RESOURCES .................................................................................................................................................... 16

ENDNOTES ..................................................................................................................................................... 17

APPENDIX A ................................................................................................................................................... 23
INTRODUCTION

Millions of individuals are affected by cybercrime each year, and the number of incidents is on the rise. In 2015, each day there were over one million cyberattacks that exposed the private information of more than 429 million people.¹ Businesses also pay a heavy price for cybercrime, which has a grim effect on their bottom line. U.S.-based companies reported in a 2015 survey that cybercrime resulted in an average cost of $15.4 million per company—more than double what it cost in 2010.² Cyberattacks also compromise our national security. In June 2015, the Office of Personnel Management announced that China had successfully hacked its system to gain access to the personal information of approximately 21.5 million current and former federal employees, military personnel, and contractors. This hack not only invaded the privacy of those individuals, but the purloined information is also valuable for espionage purposes.

Recent events have highlighted the impact of cybercrime. In December 2016, American intelligence agencies announced that the Russian government hacked the Democratic National Committee’s email system with the intention of influencing the 2016 presidential election.³ Also in 2016, Yahoo disclosed that more than one billion user accounts had been compromised in 2013, potentially leading to the release of telephone numbers, dates of birth, and other sensitive personal information.⁴ Yahoo’s disclosure has led to the Securities and Exchange Commission investigating whether it violated securities laws by failing to notify investors of the data breach sooner.

Fully preventing cybercrime is nearly impossible because of the rapid development and evolving nature of cyber technology, such as mobile devices, cloud computing, and the internet of things. Law enforcement and regulatory agencies have very limited resources to handle this ever-widening problem, requiring them to prioritize the most critical needs, leaving many cybercrimes and cyber vulnerabilities unaddressed. The public, therefore, has little choice but to rely on companies and government agencies that store personal information to prevent their websites, applications, or devices from serving as a platform for cybercrime and to protect information in their custody from cyberattacks.

Companies and government agencies can only provide this protection if their employees alert them to lax cybersecurity standards and cyber vulnerabilities. Unfortunately, retaliation against employees who blow the whistle on cybersecurity problems is all too common. Often the outcome for an employee who reports a cybersecurity problem is career stagnation or even termination. Since most Americans cannot afford to risk their jobs, their fear of retaliation deters them from reporting on inadequate cybersecurity. If we hope to change this culture of fear and encourage whistleblowing, employees need to know that they have legal protections for blowing the whistle as well as potential rewards for reporting cybercrime to the government. While Congress has not yet explicitly provided cybersecurity whistleblowers with such protections, there is a patchwork of state and federal laws that can be used to provide these protections and incentives for many cybersecurity whistleblowers.

Cybersecurity whistleblowers have both legal protections and reward incentives.

This Manual provides a compilation and discussion of the major legal claims available to cybersecurity whistleblowers. It also provides a description of the federal programs under which cybersecurity whistleblowers’ reports may lead to monetary rewards. Finally, it provides potential cybersecurity whistleblowers with specific suggestions to enhance their legal protections when blowing the whistle.

CURRENT PROTETIONS FOR CYBERSECURITY WHISTLEBLOWERS

While there is no federal statute that explicitly protects employees who blow the whistle on lax cybersecurity (in contrast, for example, to blowing the whistle about transportation or environmental issues), there are a handful of federal statutes and state laws which can provide cybersecurity whistleblowers with a basis for actionable retaliation claims. The availability of such protections, however, varies depending on the facts and circumstances of each case. To provide a basic understanding of potential claims, this section first discusses the federal statutes that may protect a cybersecurity whistleblower. It then discusses state law claims for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, and provides information about some of the federal and state sources of public policy upon which a cybersecurity whistleblower might base such a claim.

A. Federal Statutes Providing Protections to Cybersecurity Whistleblowers

There are at least six federal statutes that may provide protections to a cybersecurity whistleblower depending on the entity for which the whistleblower works and the wrongdoing the whistleblower reports.⁵ Those statutes are:

- The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which provides protections to employees who report fraud and securities violations at publicly traded companies;⁶
The Dodd-Frank Act, which provides protections to employees who report securities violations;

• The Financial Institutions Reform Recovery and Enforcement Act, which provides protections to employees who report legal violations at banks and other depository institutions;

• The False Claims Act, which provides protections to employees who oppose fraud against the government;

• The Energy Reorganization Act, which provides protections to employees in the nuclear industry who oppose violations of that law, the Atomic Energy Act or Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations; and

• The Whistleblower Protection Act, which provides protections to federal government employees who report legal violations, a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety, or gross mismanagement, waste or abuse.

At least 6 federal statutes protect cybersecurity whistleblowers.

Understanding what constitutes protected activity and an actionable adverse action under each of these statutes is essential for the effective assertion of a claim, particularly since cybersecurity whistleblowing is not the explicit focus of any of these laws. Additionally, each statute has procedural requirements for asserting a claim, which must be followed or a whistleblower will lose those protections. Below is a detailed discussion of each statute, detailing the circumstances in which cybersecurity whistleblowing could constitute protected activity, the actions taken against an employee that constitute an adverse action, and the procedural requirements of the statute.

1. Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank Protections

In 2002, in the wake of the infamous accounting fraud scandals of Enron and WorldCom, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), a law designed to curb corporate and accounting misconduct by publicly traded companies. In recognition of the vital and high-profile role of the whistleblowers in those cases, Congress included retaliation protections for employees of publicly traded companies. Eight years later, in the wake of the financial crisis that led to the Great Recession, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank) to address deficiencies in existing financial regulations. In Dodd-Frank, lawmakers included enhanced protections for whistleblowers working for publicly traded companies and new protections for those working in the financial industry, for wholly owned subsidiaries and affiliates of publicly traded companies, and for nationally recognized statistical organizations. In the years since the passage of these two laws, cybersecurity has become a critical issue for publicly traded companies and their primary regulator, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), making cybersecurity disclosures well within the reasonable boundaries of the whistleblower protections provided by these two statutes.

a) Protected activity

SOX and Dodd-Frank only protect employees when a whistleblower discloses information about specific types of wrongdoing to specific recipients. SOX provides that no publicly traded company, including its wholly owned subsidiaries or affiliates, may take an adverse action against an employee because the employee provided information regarding mail fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud, securities fraud, shareholder fraud, or any violation of an SEC rule or regulation. A whistleblower is entitled to these protections provided she makes such a report to a federal agency, a member of Congress, a supervisor, or a person working for the employer who has the authority to investigate, discover, or terminate misconduct. When a whistleblower has met both these requirements, she has engaged in “protected activity” under SOX.

Dodd-Frank, on the other hand, prohibits any employer from taking an adverse action against a whistleblower because she provided information about securities violations to the SEC, assisted the SEC in an investigation of securities violations, or made disclosures protected under SOX, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and any other law, rule, or regulation subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC. Whether an employee is considered a whistleblower if she only reports potential violations internally is an unsettled legal question under Dodd-Frank. SEC regulations say internal reports are protected, but the courts are in conflict. Until Congress or the U.S. Supreme Court clarifies the issue, in some parts of the country, an internal whistleblower will have a viable Dodd-Frank retaliation claim, but in others she will not, and, in most areas, she cannot know for sure. Because internal whistleblowers are protected under SOX, the inability to assert a Dodd-Frank claim only affects potential remedies and procedural safeguards, in that Dodd-Frank provides more generous monetary remedies, a longer statute of limitations, and the ability to file directly in federal court.

The most significant hurdle for a cybersecurity whistleblower who wishes to claim the protections of SOX and Dodd-Frank is establishing that her disclosure falls into one of the statutorily enumerated categories. A cybersecurity disclosure may not appear on its face to relate to one of the protected disclosure
4 Categories of Protected Activity

1. Fraud
2. Securities violations
3. Internal controls
4. SEC Regulations S-P and S-ID

categories; however, there are at least four potential grounds for asserting that a cybersecurity disclosure qualifies as protected activity.

i) Fraud

To the extent a cybersecurity whistleblower at a publicly traded company reports activity that can be characterized as fraudulent, this disclosure should qualify as protected activity under SOX and Dodd-Frank. Four of the statutory categories of protected SOX disclosures are violations of federal fraud statutes, specifically mail, wire, bank, and securities fraud. The Administrative Review Board of the Department of Labor (ARB), the agency responsible for enforcing the SOX anti-retaliation provisions, and the majority of federal courts have held that reports of violations of these federal fraud statutes constitutes protected activity. All disclosures protected by SOX are protected by Dodd-Frank.

An employee need only “reasonably believe” that the information she provides is a violation of one of the enumerated categories. In a useful development for cybersecurity whistleblowers, the ARB recently held that a whistleblower need not specifically explain that she believes the reported conduct violates one of the enumerated categories of protected activity under SOX, as long as she has a reasonable belief that the company engaged in fraud, or in other words, “a knowing misrepresentation or knowing concealment of a material fact.” In the context of the federal fraud statutes, a statement is material if it has a natural tendency to influence or be capable of influencing the person to whom it was addressed.

The following hypothetical example of cybersecurity disclosures meets this standard. An employee working for a publicly traded company learns information indicating that its employer is non-compliant with ISO/IEC 27001, an industry standard for information security management. The employee also discovers that the company has known it was non-compliant for years, yet to secure a major deal, represented to a client that it was ISO/IEC 27001 compliant. The employee reports this information to her supervisor. In this situation, the company’s knowing misrepresentation to the client of its cybersecurity posture could constitute fraud. If, in her report to her supervisor, the whistleblower states that she believes that the company’s conduct may be fraudulent, she likely has a strong argument that her report is protected. Even if the whistleblower does not specifically report that she believes the company has engaged in fraud, if she expresses a good-faith, reasonable belief that the company had engaged in knowing misrepresentation or concealment of the material fact of non-compliance with ISO/IEC 27001, she would have a colorable argument for protection under the more liberal ARB standard.

ii) Securities Fraud and Violations of SEC Disclosure Requirements

Publicly traded companies are prohibited from making false or misleading public statements about material facts. Specifically, Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5 prohibit fraudulent practices in connection with the purchase or sale of a security, including the knowing misrepresentation or omission of material facts. In the securities context, a “material fact” is a term of art that means a fact that a reasonable investor would have viewed as significantly altering the “total mix” of information available to him. A false or misleading public statement about a company’s cybersecurity posture could constitute securities fraud given the potentially catastrophic financial impact of cyberattacks.

Additionally, SEC regulations require the filing of periodic public disclosures and dictate the specific content of those disclosures. In 2011, the SEC’s Office of Corporation Finance issued guidance that emphasized the importance of cybersecurity disclosures in SEC filings. The guidance acknowledged that there is no specific disclosure requirement for cybersecurity risks and breaches, but emphasized that registrants are required to disclose material information about cybersecurity risks and cyber incidents so that investors have information they would consider important to an investment decision. Registrants are also required to disclose any information about cybersecurity necessary to prevent other disclosures from misleading potential investors.

The SEC provided the following examples of appropriate cybersecurity disclosures depending on the specific circumstances:

- Discussion of aspects of the registrant’s business or operations that give rise to material cybersecurity risks and the potential costs and consequences;
- To the extent the registrant outsources functions that have material cybersecurity risks, description of those functions and how the registrant addresses those risks;
- Description of cyber incidents experienced by the registrant that are individually, or in the aggregate, material, including a description of the costs and other consequences;
• Risks related to cyber incidents that may remain undetected for an extended period; and
• Description of relevant insurance coverage.31

The following hypothetical demonstrates a report that would be protected because it relates to potential securities fraud and violations of SEC disclosure requirements. An employee of a publicly traded company reports to the company compliance hotline that the company has known for years about a serious cyber vulnerability that has already allowed a data breach of critical intellectual property, yet has done nothing to correct the problem and has not disclosed either its vulnerability or the breach to the public. Since the whistleblower’s report directly references material public misrepresentations, even though she did not reference securities fraud or violations of SEC rules and regulations, it would constitute protected activity under the liberal ARB standard that only requires a reasonable belief that the company has violated one or more of the enumerated SOX category.

That being said, the whistleblower would bolster her claim if she directly stated that she believed the company’s failure to publicly report the cyber vulnerability and the breach could constitute securities fraud and could result in the company’s failure to meet the SEC’s disclosure requirements related to cybersecurity. This more explicit report would preclude an employer’s argument that the whistleblower’s report was not about one of SOX’s enumerated categories. Additionally, the more explicit report would ensure that the whistleblower met the standard applied by even the minority of federal courts that still require a complaint to relate to fraud against shareholders.32

Finally, by citing violations of SEC disclosure requirements, this more specific report provides a basis for protection that does not implicate the specialized materiality requirement for securities fraud, which can make it harder to assert a reasonable belief of fraud under that statute.

### iii) Failure to Report Material Weaknesses in Internal Controls

Publicly traded companies are required to maintain internal controls over financial reporting (ICFRs).33 Moreover, publicly traded companies are required to disclose “material weaknesses in the company’s internal control over financial reporting.”34

Inadequate cybersecurity can constitute a material weakness.35 An employee who complains about cybersecurity problems that could affect a company’s underlying financial data and records has raised issues related to a company’s internal-controls failure and, therefore, has made a protected disclosure under SOX and under Dodd-Frank in the jurisdictions that recognize internal complaints.36

### iv) SEC Regulations Protecting Consumer Data

Registered investment companies and registered investment advisers are subject to SEC regulations related to customer data protection, most notably Regulation S-P and Regulation S-ID.37 Under Regulation S-P, known as the Safeguard Rule, a covered entity is required to notify clients concerning the collection, use, and sharing of nonpublic personal information (NPI).38 The regulation also limits the disclosure of client NPI to anyone not affiliated with the entity unless the entity specifically notifies the client and the client declines to opt-out of having that information shared.39 Regulation S-ID, known as the Identity Theft Red Flags Rules, requires covered entities that maintain certain types of accounts for clients to establish and maintain programs that detect, prevent, and mitigate identity theft.40 The SEC actively enforces violations of these regulations. For example, in June 2016, the SEC levied a penalty of $1 million against Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC for cybersecurity violations that violated the Safeguard Rule.41

For an employee who reports an employer’s failure to have an adequate identity theft program to be protected by SOX, the employer needs to be a publicly traded company or a wholly owned subsidiary or affiliate of one. Unlike the other categories of protected activity, however, employees of non-publicly traded companies may be protected for raising these concerns, provided they are subject to Regulations S-P and S-ID. Unlike SOX, Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provision prohibit retaliation by any employer, not just publicly traded companies. This means that an employee who works for a firm that is regulated by the SEC, but is not publicly traded, such as a registered investment company or registered investment advisor, is protected by Dodd-Frank if they report a securities violation. Depending on the location the whistleblower is employed, the disclosure may need to be to the SEC, not just internal, to be protected under Dodd-Frank.42

---

Under both Dodd-Frank & SOX, no company may discharge, demote, threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate against an employee for engaging in protected activity.
b) Adverse Action

Section 806 of SOX states that no company “may discharge, demote, threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate against an employee in the terms and conditions of employment” because the employee engaged in protected activity under SOX. Dodd-Frank has similar language, providing that an employer may not “discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, directly or indirectly, or in any other manner discriminate against, a whistleblower in the terms and conditions of employment.”

The ARB has interpreted SOX’s statutory language to evince a “clear congressional intent to prohibit a very broad spectrum of adverse action against SOX whistleblowers,” adding that “adverse action under SOX Section 806 must be more expansively construed than [adverse action] under Title VII.” In keeping with this position, the Department of Labor has long permitted non-tangible employment actions to form the basis for a SOX retaliation claim. Federal courts in recent years have held that a variety of non-tangible employment actions constitute adverse actions for purposes of a SOX retaliation claim. Although federal courts have recognized that non-tangible employment actions qualify as adverse actions, some have been unwilling to adopt ARB’s more liberal standard for adverse action and instead still analyze adverse actions under SOX using the Title VII standard requiring that the action be “harmful enough that it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from engaging in statutorily protected whistleblowing.”

The basis of adverse action against SOX whistleblowers, then has 60 days to investigate and issue written findings as to whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the employer has retaliated against the employee. Following OSHA’s written findings, either party has 30 days to request a hearing with an administrative law judge (ALJ), during which time the parties will have the opportunity to conduct limited discovery. Either party may also appeal the ALJ’s ruling to the ARB within 14 days of the ALJ’s ruling. Both parties have 60 days to appeal the ARB’s ruling to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the jurisdiction in which the violation allegedly occurred or in which the complainant resided on the date of the violation. If the ARB has not issued a final decision within 180 days of the employee’s filing of the complaint, the employee has the right to “kick out” her complaint to an appropriate federal district court.

The procedure for filing complaints under Dodd-Frank is far less complicated. An individual alleging retaliation in violation of Dodd-Frank may file her complaint directly in an appropriate federal district court. The employee’s complaint of retaliation must be filed within three years of the date when facts material to the right of action are known or reasonably should have been known by the employee.

2. Protections for Employees of Banks and Other Depository Institutions

In the wake of the 1980s Savings and Loans Crisis, Congress passed the Financial Institutions Reform Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), which provides broad protections against retaliation for employees of both banking institutions and banking agencies. A banking whistleblower who reports insufficient data security could qualify for this protection.

a) Protected activity

FIRREA protects employees of “insured depository institutions”—i.e., depository banks—and employees of federal banking regulators who engage in protected activity. The basis for protected activity under FIRREA is quite liberal. A report of a possible violation of any law or regulation, as well as of any gross mismanagement, waste, abuse, or danger to public health or safety qualifies. In the cybersecurity context, for example, this standard would protect a disclosure of insufficient data security if it constituted a possible violation of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which requires financial institutions to protect certain consumer data, or of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, which prohibits unfair or deceptive practices in commerce, including insufficient data security.

Critically, FIRREA only protects a whistleblower if she reports externally to a federal banking agency or the U.S. Attorney General (i.e., the U.S. Department of Justice). Internal complaints of violations of law by employees at
insured depository institutions do not constitute protected activity under FIRREA. In addition, FIRREA explicitly denies protection to an employee who deliberately caused or participated in the misconduct or knowingly or recklessly provided substantially false information to the banking agency or Attorney General.

b) Adverse Action
FIRREA prohibits depository banks and federal banking regulators from discharging or otherwise discriminating against any employee with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because the employee engaged in protected activity. No courts have articulated the standard for an adverse action under FIRREA; however, it is likely that a court would apply the Title VII standard given the similarities between the two statutes’ language. Under the Title VII standard, an action is adverse if “it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” This standard includes not just tangible personnel actions, such as terminations, demotions, and pay or benefits cuts. It also includes harmful actions such as outing a whistleblower, blackballing, or even a series of smaller actions that, taken together, would dissuade a reasonable worker from participating in the protected activity.

c) Procedure
Under FIRREA, a whistleblower has the right to file a civil action in the appropriate United States district court. The whistleblower must do so within two years of the date of the retaliatory action. The statute requires that a whistleblower simultaneously file a copy of her complaint with the appropriate federal banking agency.

3. False Claims Act Protections
The federal False Claims Act (FCA) was passed in 1863 in the midst of the American Civil War in response to “alarming reports of misappropriation of money supposedly spent to aid the war effort.” The FCA authorizes private citizens who observe fraud against the government to file a “qui tam” claim on behalf of the government and share in any recovery against the wrongdoer. In 1986, the FCA was amended to protect employees who reported such fraud from retaliation, and subsequent amendments made in 2009 and 2010 strengthened the retaliation protection. This protection may be available for an employee who reports her employer’s failure to comply with federal regulations relating to cybersecurity.

a) Protected activity
The FCA protects employees, contractors, agents, or “associated others” who investigate or file a qui tam lawsuit or engage in lawful activities in an attempt to stop government fraud. Originally, whistleblowers were only entitled to protection when they experienced retaliation “because of lawful acts done by the employee on behalf of the employer or others in furtherance of an action under this section[...].” For years, many courts interpreted this to mean that the FCA protections against retaliation applied only when a plaintiff could demonstrate that FCA litigation was a “distinct possibility “ or that she had engaged in conduct that “reasonably could lead to a viable FCA action.”

The Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (FERA) amended the FCA to protect whistleblowers from retaliation for “efforts to stop 1 or more violations of [the FCA],” while the legislative history of FERA clearly indicates that Congress intended the Act’s protections against retaliation to be broadly construed. Courts continue to disagree about the scope of what activities constitute protected activity. In the wake of the FERA amendments many courts have recognized the broadened scope of protected activity under the statute. Unfortunately, several courts, apparently relying on pre-amendment precedent, have continued to apply the “distinct possibility” and “viable action” standards that restrict the protections of the statute.

The intersection between cybersecurity and government fraud is narrow, but growing.
the federal government’s expanding cybersecurity requirements, it is increasingly likely that a cybersecurity whistleblower’s disclosure might implicate this category of fraud.

Companies contracting with the government have become subject to a number of heightened cybersecurity requirements in recent years. A recent change to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) increased cybersecurity standards for companies pursuing contracts with the government. The summary of the regulation provides that the rule “is just one step in a series of coordinated regulatory actions being taken or planned to strengthen protections of information systems.”

Among other things, the rule requires that certain companies seeking government contracts comply with the standards set forth in National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-171, which provides detailed regulations for “Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information in Nonfederal Information Systems and Organizations.” The Department of Defense (DOD) recently implemented a similar rule requiring that DOD contractors adhere to the new NIST SP 800-171 standards. The DOD regulations also significantly increase the scope of information that contractors are responsible for securing; rather than only being responsible for securing information received from the government, contractors will also be responsible for securing information that is “collected, developed, received, used, or stored by or on behalf of the contractor in support of the performance of the contract.”

Because employers seeking contracts with the DOD and other agencies of the federal government are subject to these requirements, their failure to adhere to those standards may give rise to a viable claim under the FCA for express or implied false certification. Cybersecurity professionals who speak out against their government-contractor employer’s failure to meet these standards may therefore be entitled to the broadly construed protections against retaliation provided by the FCA.

b) Adverse Action

An employee has suffered an adverse action within the bounds of the FCA anti-retaliation provision when that employee is discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened, harassed, or in any other manner discriminated against in the terms and conditions of employment. Retaliation claims under the FCA are scrutinized under the same test as retaliation claims under Title VII: whether the “adverse action is one that might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from engaging in the protected conduct.” Tangible employment actions, such as termination, demotion, and pay and benefit cuts, qualify as adverse actions under this standard. So too, however, do other adverse actions, such as written warnings, diminished responsibilities, or auditing an employee’s job performance.

c) Procedure

An FCA retaliation plaintiff must bring her claim in federal district court within three years of the date of the retaliation. Unlike FCA qui tam actions, FCA retaliation claims under Section 3730(h) do not require a plaintiff to comply with often onerous filing and procedural requirements, such as filing under seal and submitting a disclosure statement, unless a plaintiff is including a retaliation claim with her qui tam claim. Additionally, if an employee files suit with both a qui tam and retaliation claim, if her qui tam claim is dismissed, her Section 3730(h) retaliation claim may survive without it.

4. Protections for Nuclear Whistleblowers

The Energy Reorganization Act of 1978 (ERA) provides important protections for employees who provide information about or participate in investigations relating to violations of nuclear safety laws and standards. Employees who speak out against cybersecurity vulnerabilities in the nuclear industry may be entitled to the same protections as those who report safety issues.

a) Protected activity

The ERA protects an employee from discrimination because she notified her employer of violations of the ERA, the Atomic Energy Act, or Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations, she refused to engage in such violations, or she otherwise participated in an NRC proceeding. While protected activity has traditionally concerned safety issues such as meltdown risks or nuclear-materials storage, there are NRC regulations relating to cybersecurity. In 2009, NRC issued a nuclear safety standard entitled “Protection of Digital Computer and Communications Systems and Networks.” Under this regulation, NRC licensees “shall provide high assurance that digital computer and communication systems and networks are adequately protected against cyber-attacks.” The regulation and its accompanying regulatory guide provide detailed cybersecurity responsibilities to which NRC licensees must adhere. Any employee of an NRC licensee has engaged in protected activity under the ERA’s anti-retaliation provisions if she opposes practices by her employer that she reasonably believed violated these cybersecurity regulations.

b) Adverse Action

The ERA prohibits an employer from discharging any employee or otherwise discriminating against any employee with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because that employee engaged in protected activity under the ERA. To qualify as an adverse action, the complainant must prove that the action significantly changed her employment status, meaning that the employer’s actions
were “harmful to the point that they could well have dissuaded a reasonable worker from engaging in protected activity.” Adverse actions thus include not only tangible employment actions, such as terminations, demotions, and pay and benefits cuts, but also non-tangible actions such as blacklisting. \footnote{115}

\section*{c) Procedure}

Employees must file complaints under the ERA with the Department of Labor (DOL) within 180 days of the date the employer made the retaliatory decision and communicated it to the employee. \footnote{116} The DOL’s Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) then has 30 days to investigate and issue written findings as to whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the employer has unlawfully retaliated against the employee. \footnote{117} Following OSHA’s written findings, either party has 30 days to request a de novo, on-the-record hearing with an administrative law judge (ALJ). \footnote{118} Either party may then appeal the ALJ’s ruling to the DOL’s Administrative Review Board (ARB) within 10 days of the ruling. \footnote{119} Both parties then have 60 days to appeal the ARB’s ruling to the United States Court of Appeals for the jurisdiction in which either the violation allegedly occurred or the complainant resided on the date of the violation. \footnote{120} In addition to these appeal rights, if the DOL has not issued a final decision within one year of the employee’s filing of the complaint, the employee has the right to “kick out” her complaint to an appropriate federal district court. \footnote{121}

\section*{5. Protections for Federal Government Employees}

Given the recent high-profile cyberattacks by foreign powers against the United States, cybersecurity is and will continue to be a serious issue for federal employees. The Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA) \footnote{122} and the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act (WPEA) \footnote{123} work together to provide meaningful protections to cybersecurity whistleblowers within the federal government.

\subsection*{a) Protected activity}

As amended by the WPEA, the WPA prohibits adverse personnel actions against employees of the federal government who disclose information based on a reasonable belief about a violation of any law, rule, or regulation; about gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, or an abuse of authority; or about a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety. \footnote{124} Such a disclosure is not protected, however, if it is prohibited by law or executive order. Due to this relatively broad language, a federal employee who raises concerns about cybersecurity likely does not have to point to a particular law or regulation she thinks is being violated to garner protections under the WPA. Rather, she need only indicate in her report that the cybersecurity lapse at issue constitutes gross mismanagement, abuse of authority, or a substantial danger to public safety.

Such an argument would be significantly bolstered, however, by pointing to a particular law, regulation, or Executive Order calling on an agency to meet certain cybersecurity standards. For example, in 2013, in Executive Order 13,636, President Obama called on “[a]gencies with responsibility for regulating the security of critical infrastructure” to adopt a (then yet-to-be-written) Cybersecurity Framework to be created by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). \footnote{125} In 2014, NIST published that Cybersecurity Framework. \footnote{126} Unless or until the Executive Order is rescinded, an employee at one of those agencies who suffers retaliation because she complained about her agency’s failure to timely adopt or adequately implement the NIST standards should be protected against retaliation.

\subsection*{b) Adverse Action}

The WPA prohibits a federal agency from taking or failing to take, or threatening to take or fail to take, a personnel action because of the employee’s protected activity. \footnote{127} A report issued by the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) provides a helpful list of personnel actions that could constitute an adverse action under the WPA:

\begin{itemize}
  \item An appointment;
  \item A promotion;
  \item An action under chapter 75 of Title 5 or other disciplinary or corrective action, including any behavior intended to modify the employee’s behavior in the future, such as a letter of admonishment;
  \item A detail, transfer, or reassignment;
  \item A reinstatement;
  \item A restoration;
  \item A reemployment;
  \item A performance evaluation under chapter 43 of Title 5;
  \item A decision concerning pay, benefits, or awards, or concerning education or training if the education or training may reasonably be expected to lead to an appointment, promotion, performance evaluation, or other action described in this subparagraph, including placing an employee in a leave without pay (LWOP) or absent without leave (AWOL) status, a denial of annual leave, or a denial of an opportunity to earn overtime pay;
  \item A decision to order psychiatric testing or examination; and
  \item Any other significant change in duties, responsibilities, or working conditions, including retaliatory investigations. \footnote{128}
\end{itemize}

The WPEA, which was passed after the MSPB report, added “security clearance harassment” as a prohibited personnel action under the WPA, meaning that agencies may no longer retaliate against federal employees by stripping them of their security clearance. \footnote{129} In 2015, the MSPB held that the creation of a hostile work environment may also constitute a prohibited personnel action under the WPA. \footnote{130}
c) Procedure

A federal whistleblower has four potential avenues to pursue her claims under the WPA. First, the employee may appeal the adverse action directly to the MSPB, which is known as a “Chapter 77” appeal. Chapter 77 appeals are available to federal employees who suffer an adverse employment action because of alleged deficiencies in an employee’s conduct or performance. A whistleblower who brings a Chapter 77 appeal is alleging that an employer took an adverse action against her because of her protected activity, not the purported deficient conduct or performance.

Second, the employee may file a charge with the U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC). If the OSC finds the complaint meritorious, it can seek corrective action from the offending federal agency. If the agency fails to take appropriate corrective action, OSC can institute an action with the MSPB on the employee’s behalf.

Third, the employee may bring an individual right of action (IRA) to the MSPB if the OSC declines to bring one on her behalf. To bring an IRA, the employee must show: (1) she engaged in whistleblowing activity by making a protected disclosure; (2) based on the protected disclosure, the agency took or failed to take a personnel action (or made such a threat); (3) she sought corrective action from OSC; and (4) she exhausted corrective action proceedings before OSC. A federal whistleblower has a right to file an IRA beginning 60 days after the OSC closes its investigation of her claims or 120 days after filing her complaint with the OSC. An employee files an IRA with one of the MSPB’s field or regional offices which then assigns it to an administrative judge (AJ). The whistleblower may then appeal the AJ’s decision to either a three-member Board of the MSPB or to the appropriate U.S. Court of Appeals. If the whistleblower elects to appeal to the MSPB, she may then appeal its decision to the appropriate U.S. Court of Appeals.

Finally, if the employee is a union member, she can pursue a grievance under her union’s negotiated grievance procedures. As a result of the 1994 WPA amendments, an aggrieved employee affected by a prohibited personnel action is precluded from choosing more than one of the available avenues of redress. In other words, a federal employee may pursue a claim for whistleblower retaliation by pursuing a grievance under the union’s negotiated procedures or by filing a complaint with the OSC or a direct appeal to the MSPB. However, if the employee chooses the grievance procedures, she is still entitled to request a review of the final decision by the MSPB, where appropriate.

B. State Laws Prohibiting Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy

Cybersecurity whistleblowers may also find protection under their state’s wrongful discharge law. In all states except Montana, employment is presumed to be “at-will.” Generally, under the at-will employment doctrine, “an employee may be terminated for a good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all,” but exceptions exist that protect employees under specific circumstances. A common exception is a law that prohibits terminations that violate “public policy.” Such prohibitions against wrongful discharges in violation of public policy exist in both statutory and common law form, but courts generally require that the public policy in question be derived from an existing statutory or constitutional provision. Wrongful discharge laws differ as to what conduct qualifies as protected activity. Some require a whistleblower to report misconduct to law enforcement or other governmental body, while others protect internal whistleblowing and many protect whistleblowers who refuse to engage in criminal activity.

States also differ as to whether a federal law can provide the basis for a state wrongful discharge claim. Over 30 states either have explicitly stated that federal law may provide the source of this public policy or have created broad public policy exceptions which would appear to encompass federal law as the source. However, some states that recognize federal law as a basis for public policy do not allow a state-law claim for wrongful termination if there already exists a federal statute providing whistleblower protections. In other states it remains an open question whether courts would consider the public policy expressed in federal statutes, rules, and regulations to be a source of public policy for purposes of a wrongful discharge claim. Given the heterogeneous development of this area of law, there is little reason to believe this question will be resolved uniformly by the states.

Some state courts have issued decisions in favor of cybersecurity whistleblowers’ ability to pursue claims under state wrongful discharge laws. In 2010, a California appeals court upheld a wrongful termination verdict for a whistleblower who raised concerns about insufficient cybersecurity protections that the employee reasonably believed violated the federal Healthcare Information Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). In a 2009 case in New Jersey, a court denied an employer’s motion for summary judgment in a statutory
Authorized persons to access electronic protected health information (e-PHI).
- Audit Controls: A covered entity must implement hardware, software, and/or procedural mechanisms to record and examine access and other activity in information systems that contain or use e-PHI.
- Integrity Controls: A covered entity must implement policies and procedures to ensure that e-PHI is not improperly altered or destroyed. Electronic measures must be put in place to confirm that e-PHI has not been improperly altered or destroyed.
- Transmission Security: A covered entity must implement technical security measures that guard against unauthorized access to e-PHI that is being transmitted over an electronic network.

If an employee who works for a covered entity subject to these regulatory requirements reports violations and her employer fires her, she may have a claim for wrongful discharge.

b) Communications Act of 1934

Cybersecurity whistleblowers who report conduct that violates the Communications Act of 1934 may have a basis for protected activity. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has interpreted three sections of the Communications Act to require telecommunications companies to meet adequate data security standards.

First, Section 201(b) of the Communications Act states that “[a]ll charges, practices, classifications, and regulations for and in connection with [interstate or foreign] communication service [by wire or radio], shall be just and reasonable, and any such charge, practice, classification, or regulation that is unjust or unreasonable is declared to be unlawful.”

Second, Section 222(a) of the Communications Act states that “[e]very telecommunications carrier has a duty to protect the confidentiality of proprietary information of, and relating to, other telecommunications carriers, equipment manufacturers, and customers[.]”

Finally, Section 222(c)(1) of the Communications Act states that “a telecommunications carrier . . . shall only use, disclose, or permit access to individually identifiable customer proprietary network information in its provision of (A) the telecommunications service from which such information is derived, or (B) services necessary to, or used in, the provision of such telecommunications service[.]”

The FCC has aggressively relied on its authority to punish companies that fail to adequately protect customer information. In April 2015, the FCC ordered AT&T to pay a $25 million fine to settle claims that multiple data breaches resulted in the leakage of hundreds of thousands of customer records, including social security numbers. Six months before that, the
FCC ordered two telecommunications carriers, TerraCom and YourTel, to pay a collective $10 million fine for allegedly storing customers’ personal information in a method that was accessible through a routine online search.\textsuperscript{163} Importantly, the FCC recently demonstrated that it does not require a massive breach to violate the Communications Act. On November 6, 2015, the FCC fined the cable company Cox Communications for failing to adequately protect customer information, even though the leak affected only a few dozen individuals.\textsuperscript{164}

As illustrated by the FCC’s enforcement actions, the Communications Act expresses a clear public policy of data security protection related to communication services. If an employee of a telecommunications carrier or contractor blows the whistle on lax data-security standards and is terminated as a result, she may have a strong claim for wrongful discharge under the laws of many states.

c) Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act

The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) created the Safeguards Rule, which requires financial institutions to take certain steps to ensure the security and confidentiality of consumer data, including names, addresses and phone numbers, bank and credit card account numbers, income and credit histories, and Social Security numbers.\textsuperscript{165} The Safeguards Rule applies to companies that provide financial products or services to consumers, including check-cashing businesses, data processors, mortgage brokers, nonbank lenders, personal property or real estate appraisers, and retailers that issue credit cards to consumers.\textsuperscript{166} The Safeguards Rule requires that financial institutions to:

- Designate the employee or employees to coordinate the safeguards;
- Identify and assess the risks to customer information in each relevant area of the company’s operation, and evaluate the effectiveness of current safeguards for controlling these risks;
- Design a safeguards program, and detail the plans to monitor it;
- Select appropriate service providers and require them (by contract) to implement the safeguards; and
- Evaluate the program and explain adjustments in light of changes to its business arrangements or the results of its security tests.\textsuperscript{167}

In states that protect whistleblowers who report violations of federal law, the GLBA provides a clear statement of public policy in favor of financial institutions taking significant steps to protect customer information. A financial institution employee who opposes lax protections of customer information and is subsequently terminated may have a strong wrongful termination claim if state law allows a federal law to serve as a basis of public policy.

d) Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914

Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 (FTCA) makes unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce unlawful and empowers the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to prosecute violations.\textsuperscript{168} The FTCA defines an “unfair” practice as one that causes or is likely to cause “substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.”\textsuperscript{169}

The FTC has exercised this authority against companies that fail to adhere to adequate standards for securing consumer data. Courts have upheld the FTC’s interpretation that unreasonable data security practices could violate Section 5 of the FTCA. Specifically, in 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld the FTC’s ability to bring an action against Wyndam Worldwide Corporation for violations of the FTCA based on data-security failures that led to three breaches of sensitive consumer data by hackers in less than two years.\textsuperscript{170} Additionally, the FTC announced on March 29, 2016, that it had settled another such action, this time against the software giant Oracle.\textsuperscript{171} The FTC had alleged that Oracle was “aware of major security issues with the Java SE software and promised consumers that installing updates to Java SE would make it ‘safe and secure.’”\textsuperscript{172} According to the FTC, however, “Oracle failed to inform consumers that the update process may have left older, potentially vulnerable versions of the software intact.”\textsuperscript{173}

Based on the Wyndam and Oracle actions, an employee who reports data breaches or deceptive communications about lax cyber security has a strong argument that her report was protected activity if the state recognizes federal law as a basis for public policy.

2. State Law Bases for Public Policy

Cybersecurity whistleblowers may not need to depend on federal law as a basis for public policy in their wrongful termination claims. States are beginning to pass cybersecurity laws and, given the public concern about cybersecurity, more states are likely to enact such laws in the future. Most common are security-breach notification laws, which exist in some form in almost every state. Many states also have laws that address data-security issues, although currently those primarily focus on governmental actors’ handling of data.

a) Security Breach Notification Laws

Security breach notification laws require entities that have been the subject of a data breach to notify individuals if the breach involved the potential disclosure of personally identifiable information (PII). States define PII differently, but most states define it with terms similar to those Arkansas uses:
Personal information” means an individual’s first name or first initial and his or her last name in combination with any one (1) or more of the following data elements when either the name or the data element is not encrypted or redacted:

(A) Social security number;
(B) Driver’s license number or Arkansas identification card number;
(C) Account number, credit card number, or debit card number in combination with any required security code, access code, or password that would permit access to an individual’s financial account; and
(D) Medical information.

As of December 2016, 47 states, as well as the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, have passed some form of security breach notification law. The National Conference of State Legislatures has created a comprehensive directory of these laws with links to the statutes themselves. The three states yet to pass a security-breach notification law are Alabama, New Mexico, and South Dakota. With the exception of employees in these three states, employees who are terminated because they have opposed their employer’s failure to promptly notify customers or clients of a data breach involving the disclosure of PII likely have a strong basis for a claim of wrongful termination in violation of public policy provided they are in a state that allows such claims.

b) Other State Cybersecurity Measures

Several states have passed additional measures relating to data security in recent years. For example, in June 2015, Connecticut passed S.B. 949, which imposes requirements on companies that contract with the state government to establish procedures for securing and protecting all confidential information. Likewise, Virginia passed S.B. 1121 in 2015, a slightly more substantial law providing that “the director of every department in the executive branch of state government shall be responsible for securing the electronic data held by his department and shall comply with the requirements of the Commonwealth’s information technology security and risk-management program.” And, in March 2016, Wyoming passed S.F. 38, “requiring agencies to adopt policies for data collection, access, security and use as specified; directing the state chief information officer to develop guidelines for local governments for data collection, access, security and use; providing a definition; requiring a report; and providing for an effective date.” Other states have passed measures that, at least to date, do not create cybersecurity requirements and thus are unlikely to serve as a strong basis of “public policy” for a wrongful termination claim.

REWARDS FOR CYBERSECURITY WHISTLEBLOWERS

While job protection is a crucial component to encourage employees to blow the whistle, some cybersecurity whistleblowers may be entitled to additional rewards. Reward programs administered by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), may all provide substantial monetary rewards for whistleblowers who are able to supply these agencies with information that leads to a successful enforcement action or settlement.

Whistleblowers can receive substantial rewards through government reward programs.

A. SEC Whistleblower Program

The Dodd-Frank Act created a whistleblower program administered by the SEC which entitles an individual who provides the SEC with original information leading to an enforcement action that results in over $1 million in monetary sanctions to receive an award of 10% to 30% of the amount collected. The SEC launched the program in 2011, and as of December 2016, had paid more than $136 million to 37 whistleblowers. To qualify for an award under the SEC Whistleblower Program, a whistleblower must “voluntarily provide” the SEC with information concerning a securities violation—i.e., the whistleblower must have provided the information to the SEC before receiving a request, inquiry or demand to provide it. The information the whistleblower provides must be “original information,” meaning that it is derived from the whistleblower’s independent knowledge or independent analysis, and must not be already known to the SEC from some other source or exclusively derived from public sources. Whistleblowers are entitled to an award if the information they provide to the SEC leads to an enforcement action that results in more than $1,000,000 in monetary sanctions. SEC whistleblowers may submit a tip anonymously if they submit it through counsel, and the SEC works vigorously to maintain whistleblowers’ anonymity throughout the process.

While not all cybersecurity problems rise to the level of securities violations, the SEC has repeatedly stated that cybersecurity is a priority for the Commission. Depending on the scope of the wrongdoing, any of the violations set forth
in Section II.A.1 may form the basis of a successful tip to the SEC. For detailed information about the rules and procedures of the SEC Whistleblower Program, read David Marshall’s *SEC Whistleblower Practice Guide*.

**B. CFTC Whistleblower Program**

The Dodd-Frank Act also directed the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) to create a whistleblower program. The rules of the CFTC Program are similar to those of the SEC. An individual who provides the CFTC with original information leading to an enforcement action that results in over $1 million in monetary sanctions is eligible to receive an award of 10% to 30% of the amount collected. Compared to the SEC Whistleblower Program, the CFTC Program is small: the CFTC has issued just four awards since it began accepting tips in September 2012. One of those awards, however, was for $10,000,000, and the Program has the funds and the potential to continue to administer sizable awards to whistleblowers who provide valuable information.

To qualify for an award under the CFTC Whistleblower Program, a whistleblower must “voluntarily provide” the CFTC with information concerning violation of the Commodities Exchange Act and related regulations—i.e., the whistleblower must have provided the information to the CFTC before receiving a request, inquiry or demand to provide it. The information the whistleblower provides must be “original information,” meaning that it is derived from the whistleblower’s independent knowledge or independent analysis, is not already known to the CFTC from some other source, and is not exclusively derived from public sources. Whistleblowers are entitled to an award if the information they provide to the CFTC leads to an enforcement action that results in more than $1,000,000 in monetary sanctions. CFTC whistleblowers may submit a tip anonymously if they submit it through counsel, and the CFTC works vigorously to maintain whistleblowers’ anonymity throughout the process.

The intersection between commodities exchange and cybersecurity principally relates to cybersecurity testing and safeguards for the automated systems used by critical infrastructures that the CFTC regulates. The CFTC has adopted rules requiring clear minimum data-security requirements for derivatives clearing organizations,182 swap data repositories,183 and specified designated contract markets.184 Cybersecurity whistleblowers who provide the CFTC with original information about the failure of one of these entities to adhere to these cybersecurity standards, or other cybersecurity rules put in place by the CFTC, may be entitled to an award under the CFTC Whistleblower Program. For detailed information about the rules and procedures of the CFTC Whistleblower Program, read Lisa Banks’ *CFTC Whistleblower Practice Guide*.

**C. Qui Tam Lawsuits under the False Claims Act**

The False Claims Act (FCA) authorizes individuals, known as relators, to file civil suits, known as qui tam actions, against persons or entities that defraud the U.S. government. Since its revitalization by an important series of amendments in 1986, the Act has proven tremendously successful, and qui tam actions have led to government recovery of over $37.6 billion.185

Under the FCA, a person who has knowingly submitted a fraudulent claim, knowingly made or used falsified records or statements to gain payment of a fraudulent claim, or conspired to do either is liable to the U.S. government for a civil penalty of between $5,000 and $10,000 per claim, plus three times the amount of damages caused by the person’s acts.186 A “claim” under the FCA is a request or demand for federal money or property, including a request made to a non-governmental recipient who the United States will reimburse for all or a portion of that money.187 For a claim to be “knowingly” made the person must have actual knowledge of the fraudulent information, or be acting in either deliberate ignorance or reckless disregard.188 In most circumstances, a plaintiff must prove an actual false claim for payment from the government was made.189

As discussed more fully in Section II.A.3, it is likely that a qui tam action involving cybersecurity issues would involve violations of the cybersecurity-related requirements set forth in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), or the recently issued Department of Defense rule expanding cybersecurity requirements for DOD contractors.190 Such an action would be based on “a false certification” theory of liability, of which there are two.191 Express false certification occurs when a claimant falsely certifies that it is in compliance with regulations that are material requirements for payment.192 Implied false certification occurs when a claimant submits a request for payment without disclosing that the claimant is in violation of a regulation or requirement that affects its eligibility for payment.193 The Supreme Court has held that, to qualify as an implied false certification, the claimant must make specific representations about the goods or services that are rendered misleading by the claimant’s failure to disclose its noncompliance with the regulation.194

Critically, the noncompliance must be with a material requirement under either theory.195 A prospective whistleblower, therefore, would be wise to seek guidance on whether adherence or failure to adhere to the regulation or requirement at issue likely would be deemed “material.” Materiality does not have a rigid definition in the context of government contracts, but the Supreme Court has provided a fairly narrow definition of materiality by providing a list of things that are not material:

The materiality standard is demanding. The False Claims Act is not “an all-purpose antifraud statute.”
or a vehicle for punishing garden-variety breaches of contract or regulatory violations. A misrepresentation cannot be deemed material merely because the Government designates compliance with a particular statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirement as a condition of payment. Nor is it sufficient for a finding of materiality that the Government would have the option to decline to pay if it knew of the defendant’s noncompliance. Materiality, in addition, cannot be found where noncompliance is minor or insubstantial.

In sum, when evaluating materiality under the False Claims Act, the Government’s decision to expressly identify a provision as a condition of payment is relevant, but not automatically dispositive. Likewise, proof of materiality can include, but is not necessarily limited to, evidence that the defendant knows that the Government consistently refuses to pay claims in the mine run of cases based on noncompliance with the particular statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirement. Conversely, if the Government pays a particular claim in full despite its actual knowledge that certain requirements were violated, that is very strong evidence that those requirements are not material. Or, if the Government regularly pays a particular type of claim in full despite actual knowledge that certain requirements were violated, and has signaled no change in position, that is strong evidence that the requirements are not material.

Despite the Supreme Court’s somewhat narrow construction of material, lower courts post-Escobar have found less explicit evidence sufficient to allow a case to proceed. The procedure for filing a qui tam action has specific requirements and failure to meet them is fatal to a relator’s claim. The relator must file a civil complaint under seal with the appropriate federal court, and then serve a copy of the complaint, along with a written disclosure of substantially all material evidence and information in the relator’s possession, on the U.S. Attorney General and the U.S. Attorney. This procedure allows the government to investigate the relator’s claims without the defendant knowing about the investigation. The government has 60 days to decide whether it will join the case, which is known as the government “intervening.” After 60 days, if the government does not take action, the relator may litigate the case on her own. Because 60 days is a fairly short limitations period, and the government is often reviewing dozens of qui tam suits at any given time, the government may request that the court grant it additional time. These requests are routinely granted to allow the government sufficient time to investigate the whistleblower’s claims.

If the government does not intervene in the action and the relator is successful, then the relator must receive between 25% and 30% of the proceeds of the suit or settlement. On the other hand, if the government intervenes, the relator receives between 15% and 25%, depending on the relator’s contribution to the prosecution of the action. Intervention is critical for the success of qui tam actions. Ninety percent of cases in which the government intervened have generated recovery while cases in which the government declined to intervene have failed to generate similar rates of recovery. This favorable success rate in cases of government intervention makes the associated reduction in award palatable for most whistleblowers. If the government chooses to intervene, it will then file a new complaint that automatically becomes the operative complaint as to all claims in which the government has intervened.

5 Things to Think about Before you Blow the Whistle:

1. Report Legal Violations, Not Just Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities
2. Put it in Writing
3. Don’t Steal Documents
4. Find Legal Representation
5. If Fired, Look for New Work

THINGS TO THINK ABOUT BEFORE YOU BLOW THE WHISTLE

While there is no way to blow the whistle that will prevent an employer from retaliating, there are steps that whistleblowers can take to ensure that they have as many legal protections as possible if the worst happens.

A. Report a Violation of Law, Not Just Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities

The law protects whistleblowers who report violations of laws or who refuse to engage in unlawful conduct. For cybersecurity whistleblowers, there may not be an obvious link between the cybersecurity vulnerability they are reporting and a legal violation. It is critical, therefore, for a cybersecurity whistleblower to articulate clearly that the issue she is reporting is not simply a cybersecurity vulnerability, but also involves actual or potential...
violations of law. In doing so, it benefits the whistleblower to be as specific as possible about the potential legal violation. Provided the whistleblower has a reasonable belief that the conduct is unlawful, she should be protected even if she is wrong.

B. Report in Writing to Someone Who Can Address the Problem

The substance of a whistleblower’s report is critical and an employee needs to have proof of exactly what she reported. Employers frequently defend themselves against retaliation claims by arguing that the employee never reported legal violations, but rather simply reported a standard IT problem, complained about a business decision, or merely advocated an alternative approach. By reporting her concern in writing, a whistleblower will avoid any dispute about the substance of her report. The report should be specific about the facts at issue and why the whistleblower believes the company’s conduct may violate the law. The report should not combine that information with complaints about other topics, such as personnel or personality conflicts. Since the report will become critical evidence if the employer retaliates against the whistleblower, the tone of the report should be professional and not insubordinate. The report should be made to someone who can address the problem, such as a supervisor or a compliance officer. Reports to co-workers will generally not be sufficient to provide a whistleblower with legal protection. It is important to remember that under some laws, a whistleblower is protected only if she reports the problem externally to law enforcement or other appropriate officials.

C. Be Careful About Taking Documents

Once a whistleblower discovers a problem, she may be tempted to launch a clandestine investigation into company files to uncover the extent of the problem. Such a campaign, however, can backfire and jeopardize the whistleblower’s legal protections. A whistleblower can generally review documents to which she has access in the normal course of business, but if she searches through a document, computer server, or even a filing cabinet that she does not have a right to access, she may be giving the company a non-retaliatory basis for terminating her. Relatedly, if her employer tells her to halt any further investigation or analysis of the matter, the whistleblower generally should comply. While arguments can be made to defend the whistleblower’s further investigation, especially if the whistleblower is considering reporting her concerns to the SEC or filing a qui tam action, the whistleblower will be in the strongest position if she fully complies with the company’s orders.

A whistleblower may also be tempted to retain incriminating company documents if the company discharges the whistleblower after she has blown the whistle. Again, the law governing such conduct is unsettled, so it is best for a whistleblower to consult with a whistleblower attorney about retaining company documents.

D. Seek Legal Representation

Given that there are few laws explicitly regulating cybersecurity and no laws explicitly protecting cybersecurity whistleblowers, it is critical for a whistleblower to seek experienced legal representation as soon as possible. If a whistleblower consults with a knowledgeable attorney prior to blowing the whistle, the attorney can advise the whistleblower on which, if any, whistleblower laws might protect her and what she must do to ensure she qualifies for protection. Specifically, the whistleblower will need to know whether internal reporting is protected, what type of law must be implicated in such a report, and how best to word the report to make clear that the cybersecurity issue involves a covered legal violation. If an employer retaliates against a whistleblower, it is even more imperative that she immediately seek representation. Some laws, such as SOX, require the whistleblower to take legal action within 180 days of termination (or other retaliatory act). The whistleblower also should not sign a severance agreement prior to discussing her case with a knowledgeable attorney. Such an agreement will almost surely release all claims the whistleblower has against her employer, and depending on the facts of the case, the whistleblower may have a strong claim for more compensation than the employer initially has offered.

E. If Terminated, Diligently Look For New Work

If an employer fires a whistleblower, the whistleblower must start looking for a new job, while at the same time pursuing a remedy for her wrongful termination. The whistleblower who wishes to hold a former employer legally responsible for the economic harm resulting from her termination has a legal obligation to make a good-faith, reasonable effort to secure new employment. That being said, the whistleblower is only required to accept a job that is substantially equivalent to the one she lost. It is critical that the whistleblower keep detailed records of all job search efforts to ensure that the employer cannot viably claim that her efforts were insufficient.

Alexis Ronickher is a partner with Katz, Marshall & Banks, LLP, a whistleblower and employment law firm based in Washington, D.C. She specializes in the representation of cybersecurity whistleblowers and employees in whistleblower-retaliation cases filed under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the Dodd-Frank Act and other federal and state laws. Matthew LaGarde, an associate at the firm, assisted in the preparation of this Manual.
**Government Resources**

- Securities and Exchange Commission: [https://www.sec.gov/](https://www.sec.gov/)
- Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA): [https://www.osha.gov/](https://www.osha.gov/)
- Department of Labor – Administrative Review Board: [https://www.dol.gov/arb/welcome.html](https://www.dol.gov/arb/welcome.html)
- Federal Communications Commission: [https://www.fcc.gov/](https://www.fcc.gov/)
- Federal Trade Commission: [https://www.ftc.gov/](https://www.ftc.gov/)

**Katz, Marshall & Banks, LLP Resources**

Katz, Marshall & Banks, LLP’s website at [www.kmblegal.com](http://www.kmblegal.com) features detailed information about how employees who have blown the whistle on unlawful conduct can fight back against unlawful retaliation and also earn financial rewards where available. Articles in the website’s Whistleblower Law section explain both the law and practicalities of whistleblowing as they play out in a wide range of industries and professions.

**Whistleblower Topics**


**RESOURCES**


**Practice Guides**


The Katz, Marshall & Banks website also hosts an informative Whistleblower Law Blog that can help keep whistleblowers and other conscientious employees up to date on new developments in whistleblower law and related news separate with broader whistleblower news and developments. See [http://www.kmblegal.com/blogs](http://www.kmblegal.com/blogs).

© Copyright 2017 Alexis Ronickher, Katz, Marshall & Banks, LLP.


4Craig Timberg and Hayley Tsukayama, Yahoo says 1 billion user accounts were hacked, Wash. Post (Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/yahoo-says-1-billion-user-accounts-hacked/2016/12/14/a301a7d8-b986-4281-9b13-1561231417c0_story.html.

5This is not intended to be an exhaustive list of all federal statutes that could provide protections, since there are other federal whistleblower statutes that could conceivably apply to a cybersecurity whistleblower under less common circumstances (e.g., an employee blowing the whistle regarding cybersecurity in aviation or trucking). In our practice, the six statutes we discuss have been the most common federal statutes to provide protection to cybersecurity whistleblowers.

618 U.S.C. § 1514A.


1218 U.S.C. § 1514A.


1418 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (limiting application of SOX to any “company with a class of securities registered under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78j), or that is required to file reports under section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78o(c) including any subsidiary or affiliate whose financial information is included in the consolidated financial statements of such company, or nationally recognized statistical rating organization (as defined in section 3(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78c), or any officer, employee, contractor, subcontractor, or agent of such company or nationally recognized statistical rating organization”).


16Id.


1815 CFR § 240.21F-2(b)(1).

19Dodd-Frank provides a successful litigant with double back pay, a statute of limitations of three years, and the ability to go directly to federal court. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h). In contrast, SOX does not have a multiplier for economic damages, has a 180-day statute of limitations, and requires that a litigant first file with the U.S. Department of Labor. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A.

2018 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1); Dietz v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., ARB No. 15-017, slip op. at 3 n.7 (Dep’t of Labor Mar. 30, 2016) (“[T]he provision protects whistleblowing about 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 (mail fraud), 1343 (wire, radio, or television fraud), 1344 (bank fraud), or 1348 (securities fraud), ‘or any rule or regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission, or any provision of Federal law relating to fraud against shareholders.’”)


2215 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(ii) (“No employer may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, directly or indirectly, or in any other manner discriminate against, a whistleblower in the terms and conditions of employment because of any lawful act done by the whistleblower . . . in making disclosures that are required or protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. § 7201 et seq.) . . . .”)}

23Sylvester, ARB No. 07-123, slip op. at 14–19.

24Dietz v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., ARB No. 15-017, slip op. at 8 (Dep’t of Labor Mar. 30, 2016). In Dietz, the plaintiff alleged that Cypress had retaliated against him for opposing the company’s employee bonus plan that violated state wage and hour laws. Id. at 8–11. Specifically, Dietz had complained that the company knowingly concealed from prospective employees a material fact, that its bonus plan in fact deducted 10 percent of participants’ salaries each month to put toward the quarterly “bonus.” Id.


2615 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
CYBERSECURITY WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS


See generally u.s. sec. and exch. comm’n, current Protections for cybersecurity whistleblowers A.1.a.


See, e.g., Halliburton, Inc. v. Admin. Review Bd., 771 F.3d 254, 259 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding that “outing” a whistleblower to his colleagues could constitute an adverse action under SOX); Guitron v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. C 10-3461 CW, 2012 WL 25708517, at *16 (N.D. Cal. July 6, 2012), aff’d, 619 F. App’x 590 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that suspension and poor performance review were adverse employment actions in this case); Hughart v. Raymond James & Assoc.s., Inc., ALJ No. 2004-SOX-9, 2004 WL 5308719, at *47 (Dep’t of Labor Dec. 17, 2004) (failure to promote); Hendrix v. Am. Airlines, Inc., ALJ No. 2004-SOX-60 to 62, slip op. at 15–16 (Dep’t of Labor July 27, 2006) (logging increased error rates and relocation were not adverse employment actions in this case); Koltchinsky v. Moody’s Corp., No. 10 Civ. 6840 PAC, 2012 WL 639162, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2012) (holding that exclusion from meetings, demotion, reduced salary and bonuses, transfer to a support role without possibility of promotion, suspension, and termination were each adverse actions).


See generally u.s. sec. and exch. comm’n, current Protections for cybersecurity whistleblowers A.1.a.


CYBERSECURITY WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS

© Copyright 2017

56 29 C.F.R. § 1980.112(a).
63 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1). The specific coverage of these laws in relation to cybersecurity is discussed in detail in Section II.B.1.
69 See, e.g., Halliburton, Inc. v. Admin. Review Bd., 771 F.3d 254, 259 (5th Cir. 2014) (in SOX case, applying the Burlington Northern standard, holding that plaintiff suffered an adverse action when defendant revealed to plaintiff’s colleagues that plaintiff was a whistleblower).
71 Difoire v. CSL Behring, U.S., LLC, 171 F. Supp. 3d 383, 394 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (in a False Claims Act case, applying the Burlington Northern standard, court noted “none of these actions, on its own, rises to the level of an adverse employment action. . . . However, viewing these actions in the aggregate, I find that Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence, albeit barely, that may allow a jury to conclude that the cumulative effect of these actions might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from engaging in protected conduct”).
73 Id.
74 Id.
77 See 37 U.S.C. § 3729(a), 3730(b).

See S. COMM. ON JUDICIARY, FALSE CLAIMS AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1986, S. REP. No. 345, at 35 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5299 (“Protected activity should . . . be interpreted broadly.”); 155 Cong. Rec. E1295-03, E1300 (daily ed. June 3, 2009) (statement of Rep. Berman) (“This subsection protects not only steps taken in furtherance of a potential or actual qui tam action, but also steps taken to remedy the misconduct through methods such as internal reporting to a supervisor or company compliance department and referrals to participate in the misconduct that leads to the false claims, whether or not such steps are clearly in furtherance of a potential or actual qui tam action.”).


See United States ex rel. Badr v. Triple Canopy, Inc., 775 F.3d 628, 637–38 (4th Cir. 2015) (acts to investigate, stop, or bring an action regarding false implied staffing certifications, i.e., security guards who were unable to use their weapons properly, can constitute protected activity for a FCA retaliation claim); Young v. CHS Middle East, LLC, 611 F. App’x 130, 132–34 (4th Cir. 2015) (plaintiffs’ internal complaints that, inter alia, using expired medicines was illegal and violated the contract were deemed protected activity under the FCA); Halasa v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., 690 F.3d 844, 847–48 (7th Cir. 2012); see also Moore v. Univ. of Kansas, 118 F. Supp. 3d 1242, 1257 (D. Kan. 2015) (“The amendment seems to sweep within its scope all conduct, complaints and reports intended to stop a FCA violation.”); Laird v. Spanish Fork Nursing & Rehab. Mgmt., LLC, No. 2:14CV850, 2015 WL 3792622, at *3 (D. Utah June 18, 2015) (plaintiff’s refusal to follow orders to backdate clinical assessments (believing added charges would therefore be false and create fraudulent billings to CMS) and stating she would not commit fraud were sufficient to state a claim for retaliatory discharge).


Licensees include persons or entities who “conduct any or all of the following activities:

- Construct, operate, and decommission commercial reactors and fuel cycle facilities.
- Possess, use, process, export and import nuclear materials and waste, and handle certain aspects of their transportation.
- Site, design, construct, operate, and close waste disposal sites.”


Overall v. Tenn. Valley Auth., ARB No. 04-073, slip op. at 11 (Dep’t of Labor July 16, 2007).


Overall v. Tenn. Valley Auth., ARB No. 04-073, slip op. at 11 (Dep’t of Labor July 16, 2007).


29 C.F.R. § 24.103(d)(2).

29 C.F.R. § 24.105(a).


29 C.F.R. § 24.110(a).

29 C.F.R. § 1980.112(a).

122 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).


127 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).


140 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3); see also MSPB Report, supra note 128, at 45.
143 Id.
144 Id.
150 See States Likely to Permit Federal Law to Form Basis for Public Policy Exception, attached hereto as Appendix A.
154 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d et seq.
156 Id.
157 Id. (citations omitted).
158 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq.
159 47 U.S.C. § 201(b).
167 16 C.F.R. § 313(k); see also FTC Privacy Primer, supra note 165.
172 Id.
173 Id.
The CFTC defines a “derivatives clearing organization” as “a clearinghouse, clearing association, clearing corporation, or similar entity that enables each party to an agreement, contract, or transaction to substitute, through novation or otherwise, the credit of the DCO for the credit of the parties; arranges or provides, on a multilateral basis, for the settlement or netting of obligations; or otherwise provides clearing services or arrangements that mutualize or transfer credit risk among participants.” U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Clearing Organizations, http://www.cftc.gov/industryoversight/clearingorganizations/index.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2017).

As the CFTC explains, “[s]wap data repositories (‘SDRs’) are new entities created by the [Dodd-Frank Act] in order to provide a central facility for swap data reporting and recordkeeping.” U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Data Repositories, http://www.cftc.gov/industryoversight/datarepositories/index.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2017).

The CFTC unanimously approves proposed enhanced rules on cybersecurity for derivatives clearing organizations, trading platforms, and swap data repositories. Dec. 16, 2015, http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7293-15. The CFTC defines “designated contract markets” as “boards of trade (or exchanges) that operate under the regulatory oversight of the CFTC,” and explains that they are “most like traditional futures exchanges, which may allow access to their facilities by all types of traders, including retail customers.” U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Designated Contract Markets, http://www.cftc.gov/industryoversight/tradingorganizations/DCMs/index.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2017).

The CFTC defines a “derivatives clearing organization” as “a


See, e.g., Florida: H.B. 1033, Ch. 2016-138, Laws of Fla. (2016) (imposed a series of requirements on the state’s Agency for State Technology to create a framework for the rest of the state government to follow to ensure that it follows best cybersecurity practices); Maryland: S.B. 542, Ch. 358, Reg. Sess. (Md. 2015) (established the State Cybersecurity Council to “review and conduct risk assessments to determine which local infrastructure sectors are at the greatest risk of cyber attacks and need the most enhanced cybersecurity measures” and “identify categories of critical infrastructure as critical cyber infrastructure if cyber damage or unauthorized cyber access to the infrastructure could reasonably result in catastrophic consequences,” among other initiatives); Washington: S.B. 6528, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2016) (imposed a requirement on the state’s Chief Information Officer to “implement a process for detecting and responding to security incidents” and “develop plans and procedures to ensure the continuity of operations for IT resources in the event of a security incident”).

The CFTC defines a “derivatives clearing organization” as “a clearinghouse, clearing association, clearing corporation, or similar entity that enables each party to an agreement, contract, or transaction to substitute, through novation or otherwise, the credit of the DCO for the credit of the parties; arranges or provides, on a multilateral basis, for the settlement or netting of obligations; or otherwise provides clearing services or arrangements that mutualize or transfer credit risk among participants.” U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Clearing Organizations, http://www.cftc.gov/industryoversight/clearingorganizations/index.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2017).

182See, e.g.:

Florida: H.B. 1033, Ch. 2016-138, Laws of Fla. (2016) (imposed a series of requirements on the state’s Agency for State Technology to create a framework for the rest of the state government to follow to ensure that it follows best cybersecurity practices); Maryland: S.B. 542, Ch. 358, Reg. Sess. (Md. 2015) (established the State Cybersecurity Council to “review and conduct risk assessments to determine which local infrastructure sectors are at the greatest risk of cyber attacks and need the most enhanced cybersecurity measures” and “identify categories of critical infrastructure as critical cyber infrastructure if cyber damage or unauthorized cyber access to the infrastructure could reasonably result in catastrophic consequences,” among other initiatives); Washington: S.B. 6528, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2016) (imposed a requirement on the state’s Chief Information Officer to “implement a process for detecting and responding to security incidents” and “develop plans and procedures to ensure the continuity of operations for IT resources in the event of a security incident”).


© Copyright 2017
## APPENDIX A

### States Likely to Permit Federal Law to Form Basis for Public Policy Exception.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Relevant Case/Citation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>Cal. Lab. Code § 1102.5(b); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330, 1335 (Cal. 1980);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>Rocky Mountain Hosp. &amp; Med. Serv. v. Mariani, 916 P.2d 519, 524–25 (Colo. 1996);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>19 Del. Code §§ 1702–1703;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District of Columbia</td>
<td>D.C. Code § 1-615.52(a)(6); Coleman v. District of Columbia, 828 F. Supp. 2d 87, 96 (D.D.C. 2011);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>Fla. Stat. §§ 112.3187–112.3195; Fla. Stat. § 448.102;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625, 631 (Haw. 1982);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>Hagen v. Siouxland Obstetrics &amp; Gynecology, P.C., 23 F. Supp. 3d 991, 1008 (N.D. Iowa 2014), rev’d and remanded, 799 F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 2015);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas</td>
<td>Palmer v. Brown, 752 P.2d 685, 689 (Kan. 1988);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>Firestone Textile Co. Div., Firestone Tire &amp; Rubber Co. v. Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730, 732–33 (Ky. 1983);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maine</td>
<td>26 Me. Rev. Stat. §§ 831 et seq.;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>Minn. Stat. §§ 181.931 et seq.;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>Fleschner v. Pepose Vision Inst., P.C., 304 S.W.3d 81, 92 (Mo. 2010);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montana</td>
<td>Mont. Code §§ 39-2-901 et seq.;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>N.J. Stat. § 34:19-3; Brown v. City of Long Branch, 380 F. App’x 235, 240 (3d Cir. 2010);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Dakota</td>
<td>N.D. Cent. Code § 34-01-20;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>Ohio Rev. Code § 4113.52(A)(1); Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc., 677 N.E.2d 308, 328–29 (Ohio 1997);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>Ore. Rev. Stat. § 659A.199;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhode Island</td>
<td>R.I. Gen. L. §§ 28-50-1 et seq.;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>Tenn. Code § 50-1-304; Reynolds v. Ozark Motor Lines, Inc., 887 S.W.2d 822, 824 (Tenn. 1994);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utah</td>
<td>Rackley v. Fairview Care Ctrs., Inc., 23 P.3d 1022, 1027 (Utah 2001);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1090 (Wash. 1984); and</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>